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One of the most problematic verses in the epistles of Paul is
perhaps 1 Cor 15:56,* This verse stands almost at the end of the
long and well-known passage in Paul's first letter to the Corinthians
dealing with the issue of the resurrection of believers at the end of
time.
After two quotations of OT passages, introduced to describe the
future destiny of death at the end of time (vv. 54-55), and before
a doxology expressing gratitude to God for the victory over death
through Jesus Christ (v. 57), the apostle makes a statement about
the relation between death, sin, and law: 'The sting of death is sin,
and the power of sin is the law' (v. 56).
This verse has given rise to a variety of interpretations in the
history of exegesis. The most radical solution with regard to the
seeming dissonance of these words in the whole of Paul's argumen-
tation is the assumption of a gloss or interpolation, either by the
apostle himself at a later time or by a redactor or editor of (some
of) the Pauline letters. The critical apparatus of Nestle-Aland26
refers to the Dutch scholar J.W. Straatman as the one who was the
first to conjecture verse 56 to be an interpolation. In his book on
the first letter of Paul to the Corinthians Straatman underlines on
the one hand the Pauline character of the verse but stresses on the
other hand its dissonance in the context, which does not deal with
sin or law at all. Consequently, he argues that the verse is an inter-
polation, a dogmatic note, inserted by someone who knew the corpus
paulinum quite well.'
* We wish to thank Dr. A.J. Malherbe who was so kind to read the manuscript
and make many helpful suggestions with regard to content and style.
1 See J.W. Straatman, Kritische Studiën over den len Brief van Pautus aan de Karin-
tiiri I-II (Groningen: Van Giffen, 1863-1865) II, 284.
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Many scholars agreed with his conjecture of a gloss, among
whom Von Soden, Johannes Weiss, Bousset, and Moffatt.2 In the
course of time, however, students of the New Testament have
become more sceptical towards the results of the Konjekturalkritik of
the nineteenth century. And nowadays there is an almost general
agreement about the authenticity of verse 56.'
But that does not mean that the problems with regard to this
statement and its position in chapter fifteen have been solved.
Quite the contrary. The verse remains a puzzler4 and can be
classified among 'the things that are hard to understand' in Paul's
letters (2 Pet 3:16).5 One problem is, for instance, the question of
how the statement about death, sin, and law functions in the whole
of Paul's argumentation in chapter fifteen. Interpreters usually
leave this question open and confine themselves to the interpreta-
tion of the statement itself. They often refer to Paul's letters to the
Galatians and the Romans, especially to Rom 5-8, where the triad
death-sin-law recurs, and attempt to interpret 1 Cor 15:56 from
what is said in those letters about the relation between death, sin,
and law.
This procedure is followed in almost all modern commentaries
on 1 Corinthians6 and in a number of monographs on Paul's
attitude towards the (Jewish) law.7 His attitude towards the Torah
2 See F.W. Horn, '1 Korinther 15,56 - cm exegetischer Stachel', ZNW 82
(1991) 88-105, esp. 89-90.
1 F.W. Horn himself is still in favour of the idea that verse 56 is a gloss, inserted
by 'a pupil of Paul' (Stachel, 104-105).
* Or, in the words of U. Wilckens, 'Im dortigen Kontext ist dieser Satz in
seiner gedrangten, sentenzhaften Kürze ràtselhaft . . ." ('Zur Entwicklung des
Paulinischen Gesetzesverstandnisses', NTS 28 [1982] 161).
5 So, e.g., M. Winger, By what law? Tfu Meaning of Nàftoç in the Letters of Paul
(Atlanta: Scholars, 1992) 1.
6 So, e.g., H. Conzelmann, Der erste Brief an die Kvrinthcr (2d éd.; Göttingen:
Vandenhocck i Ruprecht, 1981) 361-2; G.D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Connthtans
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987)805-7; H. Lietzmann, An dit Konnlher 1-H(Tub-
ingen: Mohr, 1969) 88; A. Robertson-A. Plummer, A Critical and Exegctical Com-
mentary on the First Epistle of Si Paul to the Corinthians (Edinburgh: Clark, 1911) 378-9.
7 For some recent studies on Paul's attitude to the law, see, e.g., A. van
Duimen Die Theologie dei GeseUes bei Paulus (SBM 5; Stuttgart: Katholisches
Bibelwerk, 1968); J D.G. Dunn, Jesus, Paul and the Law (Louisville:
Westminster/John Knox, 1990); H. Hübner, Dos Gesetz bei Paulus. Ein Beitrag zum
Werden der paulmischen Theologie (FRLANT 119; 2d éd.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck
4 Ruprecht, 1980); B.L. Martin, Christ and the Law in Paul (Suppl. NT 62;
Leiden/New York/Kabenhavn/Koln: Brill, 1989); H. Râisànen, Paul and the Law
(WUNT 29; Tubingen: Mohr, 1983); E.P. Sanders, Paul, the Lam and the Jewish
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is generally regarded as the clue to his understanding of the relation
between death, sin, and law. Even when exegetes bring the context
of 1 Corinthians explicitly into the discussion,8 they seemingly can-
not interpret 1 Cor 15:56 without referring to other Pauline letters.
Their conclusion seems inevitable: as early as 1 Corinthians Paul's
attitude towards the law was two-sided. Besides a positive assess-
ment of the law, the apostle was fully aware of other aspects of the
law, viz. those which were obsolete and poor, which belonged to the
old order and the sphere of death and sin.9 Consequently, Paul's
statement about death, sin, and law in 1 Cor 15:56 looks like 'a
brief compendium of his own theology as to the relationship of sin
and the law to death',10 which he, in a more polemical situation
when Judaizing had become a problem, had to work out in more
detail.
Though this interpretation of 1 Cor 15:56 may seem attractive,
it is not without problems. The position and function of this brief
statement on the connection between death, sin, and law in the con-
text of chapter fifteen is not yet explained. Why did Paul insert
these words in an argument on the resurrection of believers in
which sin has hardly figured and law not at all? And if we need
other Pauline letters to explain the statement on death, sin, and law
in 1 Corinthians, may we expect the Corinthians to have under-
stood these words without any further comment? Or must we con-
clude that the communication between Paul and his addressees
might have failed in this respect? And, even more important, does
1 Cor 15:56 really show an aspect of Paul's attitude towards the
Jewish law, an issue so prominent in his polemics against Judaizing
Christians, but which seems totally absent in the Corinthian situa-
tion? As far as we know, all interpreters of this verse start from the
People (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983); P.J. Tomson, Paul and tht Jewish Law.
Haiakha in tkt Utters of the apostle to the Gentiles (Assen/Maastrichl/Minneapolis: Van
Gorcum/Fortress, 1990); U. Wilckens, Entwicklung; M. Winger, Law.
8 Like, e.g., Th. Soding, ' "Die Kraft der Sünde ist das Gesetz" (l Kor 15,56).
Anmerkungen zum Hintergrund und zur Pointe eincr gesetzeskritischen Sentenz
des Apostels Paulus', ZNW&3 (1992) 74-8+; and F. Thielman, 'The coherence of
Paul's view of the law: the evidence of First Corinthians', NTS 38 (1992) 235-53.
9 On the tension between Paul's positive and negative statements about the
law, see esp. H. Râisânen, Law, 140-54; B.L. Martin, Law, 19-20; 37-68; F.
Thielman, Law, passim.
'° G.D. Fee, Corinthians, 805.
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interpretation of vo|*oc as the Torah, the Jewish law. But is this
interpretation correct?
In the following, we will make a new attempt to analyse Paul's
statement on the connection between death, sin, and law in 1 Cor
15:56 and to understand it in the context of Paul's communication
with the Christian believers in the community of Corinth and not
primarily from what is said in other Pauline letters. We will argue
that both the connection between death and sin and the connection
between sin and law are to be understood against the background
of Hellenistic popular philosophy. Paul uses Hellenistic concepts
current in popular philosophy to describe the deplorable state of
humanity as one which is governed by death, sin, and law. He does
so in order to contrast the present state of humanity with the eternal
glory which will not to be received by the believers until Christ's
parous ia.
1. The role of death in the context of 1 Cor 15:56
In the fifteenth chapter of 1 Corinthians the apostle Paul
discusses the resurrection of believers at the parousia of Christ. As
an important item in his argumentation he stresses a few times the
role of death in the life of mankind. He calls it 'the last enemy to
be destroyed' at Christ's parousia (v. 26). Just before verse 56 the
apostle returns to the issue of death. In verses 54-55 he refers to the
end of time when death will be 'swallowed up in victory' (v. 54),
a paraphrase of Isa 25:8, which he combines with another quotation
from the OT, viz. Hos 13:14, 'Death, where is your victory?
Death, where is your sting?'
Both citations vary from LXX (and MT), in vocabulary as well
as—partly—in function. The passage of Isa 25:8 seems to be the
key verse. Its function in 1 Cor 15 is in line with the OT context,
where it is proclaimed that God will conquer death on the day of
salvation. Paul introduces, or takes over," the formula EÎÇ vïxoç, not
used in Isa 25:8 LXX, but a more or less common LXX idiom for
11 On a possible Vorlage of Paul's quotation, see D.-A. Koch, Dit Schrift als Zeuge
des Euangeliums. Untersuchungen zur Verwendimg und zum Verstandnis der Schrift bei
Paulus (Tubingen: Mohr, 1986) 60-63; Chr. D. Stanley, Paul and the language of
Scripture. Citation technique in the Pauline Epistles and contemporary literature (Cambridge:
University Press, 1992) 209-211. See further F.W. Hom, Stachel, 97-99; F.
Thielman, Coherence, 248.
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the translation of the Hebrew Hïri, 'for ever', which is found in Isa
25:8 MT. By taking t£ç vîxoç literally, meaning 'to victory', he can
interpret 'the victory over death through Jesus Christ' (v. 57) as the
fulfillment of Isaiah's proclamation in Isa 25:8.
Next, Paul introduces a second OT passage, viz. Hos 13:14,
which he—over against MT but perhaps in line with LXX—
understood as another reference to the future destiny of death. He
obviously saw in the two phrases both beginning with the inter-
rogative adverb nou rhetorical questions, meant to ridicule death
and to show that the end of its power has come.12 The most impor-
tant differences from LXX (and MT) are the double vocative
9avaTE instead of oivocTt ... SSi) in the LXX (or TO ... 'rMV in MT)
and the introduction of -co vïxoç for the LXX word 8£xT) (or "QT in
MT). Through these changes, which seem Pauline adaptations of
the OT text,13 the Hosea text is brought to a high degree into verbal
agreement with the Isaiah quotation. Both OT texts are now sup-
plementary and strengthen each other in their function of showing
the end of the power of death.
In spite of the victory over death 'through our Lord Jesus Christ'
(v. 57), in spite of the fact that at the end of time, at Christ's
parousia, death will definitely be destroyed as 'the last enemy' (v.
26), Paul emphasizes that death still is an active power in the life
of mankind. For man still is perishable, mortal. In this context,
Paul introduces the Adam-Christ analogy, for the first time in his
surviving letters: as Adam stood at the beginning of the old order,
Jesus Christ stands at the beginning of a new one. Consequently,
'since death came through a human being', viz. the first man,
Adam, 'the resurrection of the dead has also come through a
human being' (v. 21; NRSV). Or, in the words of verse 22, 'for
as all die in Adam, so all will be made alive in Christ' (NRSV).
Further on, in verses 45-49, Paul refers to the physical, earthly
character of man conforming to the first man Adam over against
the image of the spiritual man of heaven which the believers will
11 On the rhetorical use of nou, see further, e.g., 1 Cor 1:20; Rom 3:27; Gal
4:15; Ps 42:4, 11; Isa 19:12; 33:18; 36:19; 37:13; 51:13; 63:11, 15; Jer 2:28; in
Jewish) Hellenistic literature, Sib Or 5:67; 8:43-45, 79; Epictetus, Diucrtaliones
III, 10, 17; Plutarch, Consolatio ad Apollonium 15 (Mor. 110 D); Marcus Aurelius
X, 31; XII, 27, etc. See also K. Berger, Exegesr da Ntuen Testaments (2d éd.;
Heidelberg: Quelle t Meyer, 1984) 48.
13 See Chr. D. Stanley, Paul, 211-215.
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bear in the future. All men have shared the existence of the first
Adam, the believers, however, will receive a heavenly body,
spiritual and imperishable, at the end of time, due to their relation-
ship with the risen Jesus Christ.14
By presenting mortality as something going back to the first man
Adam, Paul shows familiarity with Jewish traditions.15 Jewish
apocalyptic authors, for instance, like those of 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch,
attributed death to the transgression of Adam, who broke God's
command not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil
(Gen 2:17; 3:1-24). Thus, Adam was regarded as the one by whose
transgression physical death and an age of disaster and pain was
brought to mankind (4 Ezra 3:7, 'And you laid upon him one com-
mandment of yours; but he transgressed it, and immediately you
appointed death for him and for his descendants ...';16 2 Bar 17:2-
3, 'For what did it profit Adam that he lived nine hundred and
thirty years and transgressed that which he was commanded?
Therefore, the multitude of time that he lived did not profit him,
but it brought death and cut off the years of those who were born
from him'17).
It was not only apocalyptic authors who found the explanation
for the origin of death in Adam's transgression; other Jewish
writers, like Philo, also did so. Philo's description of the first man
reflects above all Greek philosophical concepts. According to him,
Adam lived as a human being on the borderline of two worlds.
While his body and sense-perception were shared with the animals,
by virtue of his reason, his rational soul or mind, he could con-
template the heavens. At the very first beginning Adam was a
14 On the Adam-Christ analogy, see in particular E. Brandenburger, Adam und
Christus. Exegetisch-religionsgeschichtlicke Unttrsuchung zu Rom. 5,12-21 (1. Kor. 15)
(Neukirchen: Neukirchener, 1962); A.J.M. Wedderburn, Adam and Cftrùt (Cam-
bridge 1970 [unpublished dissertation]); H.-H. Schade, Apokalyptisckt Christologie
bei Paulus (2d éd.; Götlingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984) 69-87; and the
literature mentioned in the Commentaries, ad 1 Cor 15:21-22, 45-49. On the
future victory over death, see also M.C. de Boer, The Deject of Death. Apocalyptic
Esc/ialoiogy in J Corinthians 15 and Romans 5 JSNT Suppl. 22; Sheffield: JSOT,
1988).
11 See esp. E. Brandenburger, Adam, 15-64; J.R. Levison, Portraits of Adam in
Early Judaism. From Sirach to 2 Baruch (JSP Suppl. 1; Sheffield: JSOT, 1988), and
the literature mentioned in this monograph.
16 Trans. B.M. Metzger in J. Charlesworth (éd.), Old Testament Pseudepigrapka
(OTP).
17 Trans. A.F.J. Klijn in OTP.
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world citizen, living according to nature, which was the ideal of
Cynicism and Stoicism. The first man was certainly more excellent
in body and soul than all his descendants. But after the creation of
woman the nature of the first man changed considerably. Mutual
desire and bodily pleasure made man and woman sin, '... pleasure
which is the beginning of wrongs and violation of law, the pleasure
for the sake of which men bring on themselves the life of mortality
and wretchedness in lieu of that of immortality and bliss
(ÛJtaXXârrovrai -càv SvrjTÔv xai xaxoSatuova PÎOV àvr' àSavàtou xai
eù8a£(iovoç)' (OpiJ. mundi 134-69, esp. 152).18 Physical death came
as the result of the first man's transgression of God's commands
(Quatst. in Gen. 1, 51). All this implies that the traditional Jewish
concept of Adam's transgression of God's command as the origin
of mortality was employed by Paul in his argumentation on the
future resurrection of believers and the power of death in the pres-
ent situation of mankind. In Paul's view, death will remain a
mighty power to which all mankind is subjected until the end of
time.
Paul stresses the power of death in the present age, because his
Corinthian addressees seemed to neglect it in their enthousiastic
experiences of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. They felt wise, free,
superior, and powerful,19 and they taunted death as something
irrelevant. Such behaviour was common in Stoic and Cynic
circles,20 and their slogans and ideas were obviously attractive to
the Corinthians. In 1 Cor 15:54-55, Paul, too, derides death, but
underlines that the triumph over death will be achieved not until
the parousia. For the time being, death is still a power to be taken
quite seriously.
" Trans. F.H. Colson-G.H. Whitaker in Loeb Classical Library (LCL).
19 On the concepts of £Xcu6tp£a and ^Oudia in the Corinthian community, see
esp. F.S. Jones, Freiheit, 27-69; S. Vollenwcider, Freikeil aïs mue Schôpfung. Eine
UntersHchung ZUT Eleulheria bei Paulas und in seiner Umwell (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck
» Ruprecht, 1989) 199-246; AJ. Malherbe, 'Determinism and Free Will in Paul:
The Argument of 1 Corinthians 8 and 9', to appear in a volume edited by Troeis
Engberg-Pedersen and dedicated to the subject of Paul's Hellenistic milieu (Min-
neapolis: Fortress).
20 Cynics and Stoics despised death and taunted it. Feeling free, they did not
fear death. See J. Dalfen, Formgcsctiichtlicke Untersuchungen zu den Selbstbetrachtungen
Marc Aurels (Diss. München, 1967) 175-203; H. Niehues-Pröbsting, Der Kynismus
des Diogenes und der Begnff des Zynismus (München: Wilhelm Fink, 1979) 140-9; S.
Vollenweider, Freikeil, 72-74.
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2. The relationship between death and sin in 1 Cor 15:56
At the end of 1 Cor 15, Paul goes into the subject of death and
the present age. Quoting Hos 13:14 in addition to the Isa 25:8
phrase, he could add a few more words about the connection
between the power of death and man. Through Hos 13:14 Paul
introduces the notion of 'the sting (TO xevrpov) of death', represen-
ting death as a scorpion or some kind of insect, able to 'sting'.21 In
the context, and applied to the connection between death and man,
it means that death 'stings' men, making them perishable, mortal.
Death injects mortality in man, and the means by which it does so
is sin. This is what verse 56a means.
The mentioning of ' the sting of death' in Hos 13:14 enabled Paul
to speak about the way in which death has the whole human race
in its power. In his view, the 'sting' through which death brings
mortality to all men, is 'sin', TJ iuapTÏa.22 According to Paul, there
is a clear connection between death and sin, between the power of
death and the power of sin,23 both being active in the life of
mankind.
This connection was not Paul's own invention. Again, he took
over a Jewish Hellenistic concept. As argued above, in many early
Jewish writings we find the notion that Adam's transgression was
the origin of mortality. But that did not necessarily imply that
through Adam's transgression of God's law sin too appeared as a
power in the present age. Death was transmitted to the human race,
but sin was not. Of course, Jewish authors were aware of the fact
that many of Adam's descendants sinned. Especially in apocalyptic
writings the present time was regarded as an age of evil in which
sin was omnipresent. On the other hand, however, they did not
consider sin something absolutely unavoidable. Adam was a
paradigm of man's possibility to choose, all men have free will and
are able to choose, and are responsible for their own deeds. The law
of God, the Torah, is given to them in order to make the right
choice. Each one determines his (or her) destiny, whether salvation
21 On the use of xivrpov, see the Commentaries, ad locum, and F.W. Horn,
Slachel, 94 n. 16.
22 The genitive of TOO oavdtou is possessive.
25 Death and sin are represented here as some kind of powers. Cf. E. Branden-
burger, Adam, 158-68 (on Rom 5:12).
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or damnation. The notion of hereditary sinfulness was strange to
these Jewish authors.24
Philo, however, explicitly connects the Jewish concept of Adam's
transgression as the origin of mortality to the present state of sin-
fulness of all mankind. As said before, Philo depicts the first man
Adam as 'the bloom of our entire race' (Opif. mundi 140), more
excellent in body and soul than all his descendants and living as a
world citizen, acting according to the law of nature. After the 'fall'
man's life of 'immortality and bliss' was changed into one of 'mor-
tality and wretchedness' (Opif. mundi 152). Philo employs here the
Greek philosophical concept of gradual degeneration, i.e. the
notion that after the golden age of the beginning humanity
degenerated to the present deplorable state,25 and he applies this
concept to Adam and his descendants. Adam's descendants are
inferior to the first man, Adam, who 'surpassed all the men that
now are, and all that have been before us' (Opif. mundi 140). And
'as generation follows generation, the powers and qualities of body
and soul which men receive are feebler' (Opif. mundi 141; cf. 148).26
Far from being world citizens living in harmony with nature, men
have preserved only faint marks of the first man. Men's souls 'are
filled with many sins' over against the souls of the first creatures,
which were 'pure of evil' (Quaest. in Gen. I , 32). When Adam and
Eve transgressed God's command, 'they needed that which is made
by hand and corruptible' in order to cover their nakedness; for their
knowledge of being naked was 'opinion and the beginning of evil',
which introduced 'a strangeness ... conceived by the mind toward
the whole world' (Quaest. in Gen. 1, 40)."
Most probably, it was this Greek concept of degeneration linked
up with the Jewish notion of mortality and an age of evil and pain
as a consequence of Adam's transgression, as found in a Jewish
Hellenistic author like Philo, that was used by Paul to describe the
connection between death and sin, as he does in 1 Cor 15:56.2a
After Adam's transgression of God's command, his violation of the
law of God, mankind is characterized by mortality and sinfulness.
Cf. esp. E. Brandenburger, Adam, 15-45; 165; J.R. Levison, Portraits, passim.
See aJso section 3 B below.
Trans. F.H Colson-G.H. Whitaker in LCL.
Trans. R. Marcus in LCL.
In Romans, Paul wil] return to this theme, see Rom 5:12-21.
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Whether Paul thinks of a gradual degeneration or a sudden change
to an age of wretchedness is not clear. In any case, in Paul's view,
the Urzeit has passed, the age of the powers of death and sin has
come, and it is not until the parousia of Jesus Christ that death will
once and for all be overcome. By connecting death with sin Paul
emphasizes the fallen nature of mankind from which Christians will
be saved through resurrection at the end of time. The victory over
death and the absence of sin at the end of time, are contrasted with
the everyday reality of the Corinthians.
3. The relationship between sin and taw
Paul goes even further in his depiction of the deplorable state of
humanity: law too is part of man's state of wretchedness, for 'law
is the power of sin'. Since Paul is talking about death and sin in
general terms, as universal powers, albeit in a Jewish-Christian
context, we may argue that Paul uses the word 'law' (vou.oc), too,
as a general term and not as referring specifically to the Jewish law
(Torah).29 In the context of 1 Cor 15 the issue of the Jewish law,
or Judaism in general, is not at stake at all. 'The law' in verse 56,
or rather: law, that is, all laws, including the Jewish law, is looked
upon as the power of sin. The parallelism between verse 56a and
56b invites us to interpret Buvau,ic as the 'power' through which sin
is brought about.30 The law is the stimulus of sin; it empowers men
to sin. That is the meaning of verse 56b. In Paul's opinion, sin,
being the sting of death, is incited by the law.
The connection between sin and law seems at first sight not very
understandable, especially in the context of 1 Cor 15:54-57 and
29 From a thorough analysis of the different components of meaning in VÓJJLOC
as used by Paul, M. Winger comes to the conclusion that in Paul's undisputed
letters '.., vouoç most often refers definitely to Jewish vóuoc', but not always: '...
despite the preponderance of references to Jewish vóuoc, Paul understands and
uses the term vou.o< in a broader sense, to refer to things other than Jewish vóuoc'
(Law, 86). According to Winger there are, for instance, two references to vófioi;
generically, viz. Rom 4:15b and 5:13b (Law, 83-84), verses that reflect a similar
argumentation to that in 1 Cor 15:56. However, with regard to the latter passage,
he remarks that he cannot see anything 'that is useful for establishing its meaning'
(Law, 36 n. 87). Nevertheless, Winger finds in 1 Corinthians at least one passage
where vofjioc does not exclusively refer to Jewish law. He correctly interprets 6
vóuoc in 1 Cor 9:8 as referring to 'a larger class of vóuot', of which the 'law of
Moses' in 9:9 is a 'member' (Law, 71).
30 For this use of Suvauic, see, e.g., Test. Dan 4:1 auvctt TTJV SOvantv TOÜ 9u[iou,
'understand the power of anger', i.e., understand how anger works in man.
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without Paul's letters to the Galatians and the Romans. Yet Paul's
little aside about sin and law can be compared with certain views
expressed by a number of popular Hellenistic philosophers. These
philosophers too regard law(s) as part of the deplorable state of
humanity, i.e. of its wretchedness and wickedness (xoxfat), or to use
a more Jewish-Christian word, sin (a|iapt£a). Especially among the
Cynics we find a sharp criticism of the laws as part of their attack
on man's disturbed sense of morality. In their criticism we can
discern two concepts about laws and their place in life, which are
found in many layers of classical and Hellenistic philosophy. The
first concept (A) is the antithesis of cum; versus vofioc; the second
concept (B), which is closely related to the physis-nomos antithesis,
is that of the 'origin and degeneration' (Ursprung und Entartung) of
human culture. We will first examine these two concepts and then
turn to some hard core Cynic criticisms on laws.
A. The antithesis COCTLC versus vóuo;
The antithesis of physis versus nomos (nature vs. law) originated
among the Sophists in the fifth century B.C.E.31 Before the
antithesis came into being the words physis and nomos were used in
a complementary manner. The law was seen as a god-given way to
establish an order in agreement with the natural order of the
cosmos (ÇÛCTIÇ). According to Heraclitus for instance, there was one
eternal cosmic order, which was the basis of truth and in accord-
ance with which one should act (JCOIEÏV xocrà çûmv). The human laws
were in accordance with this god-given order.32 The antithesis
arose partially as a result of the troubled circumstances at the end
of the fifth century which led to a questioning of the validity of the
moral canons.33 The Sophists focused their attention on human
11 The first occurrence of the antithesis is found in Hippocrates (5th-4th century
B.C.E.), who applied it to describe the differences between cultures in his Htpi
àéptitv ûSâTùiv TOKÙJV. See F. Heinimann, Nomos und Physis. Herkunjt und Bedeutung
finer Antithese im griechischen Denken des 5. Jahrhunderts (Basel: Friedrich Reinhardt,
1945); M. Pohlenz, 'Nomos und Physis', Hermes 81 (1953) 418-38 (also in his
Kleine Schriften [Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965], II, 341-60); for a brief introduc-
tion to this topic see also W.K.C. Guthrie, The Sophists (Cambridge: University
Press, 1971) 55-134; S.-R. Nam, Dos Problem 'Pfysis '- 'Nomos ' tm griechischen Denken
im Verbatims zur chinesisfhen Philosophie (Diss. Heidelberg, 1985) 7-90, and S.
Vollenweider, Freiheit, 87-96.
" Heraclitus, frgs. 112, 114(H. Diels-W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker
[6th éd.; Berlin: Weidmann, 1951] I, 176).
" W.K.C. Guthrie, Sophists, 94; S.-R. Nam, 'Physis'-'Nomos', 43.
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matters like ethics and politics rather than on nature. Protagoras'
principle that man is the measure of all things,3* was also applied
to the laws, which resulted in the opinion that laws were not god-
given, but man-made. Laws were regarded as the products of com-
mon human opinion, passed in order to regulate society, whereas
pkysis was seen as the underlying eternal truth on which the laws
should be based.
Fully developed and applied as a critique on human laws and
conventions the antithesis is found in Hippias and Antiphon.35 In
Plato's Protagoras Hippias addresses his fellow-debaters as follows:
'I regard you all as kinsmen and intimates and fellow-citizens by
nature, not by law: for like is akin to like by nature, whereas law,
despot (-uupavvoc) of mankind, often constrains us against nature'.36
Nature and law are directly opposed to each other: law, being the
product of human opinion and convention, prevents man from
knowing the truth (ipûaiç), which all philosophers are akin to.
Xenophon, too, records Hippias' critical attitude towards the law.
In discussion with Hippias, Socrates holds the opinion that 'he who
acts lawfully (vo(ii(iOi;) is just, and he who acts unlawfully (âvo(ioç)
is unjust'. But Hippias objects, 'laws can hardly be thought of
much account, Socrates, or observance of them, seeing that the
very men who passed them often reject and amend them'.37 Hip-
pias' point is that righteousness is not found in the laws because
they are mere human convention. Only nature (ipCoic), also called
the law of nature, is the basis of real righteousness.
Antiphon, a contemporary of Hippias,38 voices the same opinion
as Hippias: 'those [regulations] of the laws are adventitious, those
of nature necessary' (frg. 44 A, col. 1). Even more, 'most of what
is righteous according to law is hostile to nature' (Ta TtoXXà TCÖV xatà
vó(iov SixaiGjv jcoXtuito; -riji çûaei xeTtai, frg. 44 A, col. 2).
Righteousness and truth can only be found by following the 'laws
of nature' (frg. 44 A, col. 1). Human laws are insufficient for they
34 Plato, Theaetftus 152 A; Sextus Empiricus, Pynhoniae inslilulionts I, 216.
31 The nature-law antithesis is not exclusively used to criticize laws, but also
vice versa, to criticize nature. In the latter case, nature is seen as a savage state
of being (not divinely ordained) and law as the regulating order of cultivation. See
W.K.C. Guthrie, Sop/usts, 60-84.
36 Protagonu 337 C-D (trans. W.R.M. Lamb in LCL).
37 Memorabilia IV, iv, 13-14 (trans. E.C. Marchant in LCL).
38 Antiphon (480-411 B.C.E.) is known to us through various fragments to be
found in H. Diels-W. Kranz, Vorsokmlilta, II, 337-70.
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cannot prevent unrighteous deeds nor take away the suffering of
victims; the law lets it all happen. And when it comes to a trial it
appears that the law favours the guilty as much as the innocent (frg.
44 A, col. 6).
The Sophists' criticism of human laws was inspired by their
search for eternal and universal righteousness and truth. Laws did
not belong to the eternal order of nature; however, that did not
mean that all laws were useless. Laws did establish a certain order,
yet an order based on fear. Critias, another Sophist, writes that
laws were instituted by people in order to chastise, and because
people then transgressed the laws secretly the people invented gods
who were said to see even the hidden trespasses of the law.39 The
order established by the law has its ground in fear and not in
righteousness or truth. Only by relating the laws to cuuu; could real
righteousness be established. So on the one hand laws were seen as
necessary because of the wickedness of mankind, but on the other
hand the Sophists realized that laws themselves could not establish
any righteousness.40 Furthermore, laws were an obstacle to real
righteousness.41
After the fifth century B.C.E. the nature-law antithesis was
adopted in various ways by numerous philosophers. Especially the
Cynics picked up the antithesis*2 and applied it rigorously to their
ideas on ethics. Diogenes Laertius says about Diogenes of Sinope
(404-323 B.C.E.), who may be considered the first real Cynic, that
'he did not give such authority to the things according to law (xorac
VÓ|JLOV) as to the things according to nature (xa-ca çûaiv)'.43 The law
belonged to a city (itoXiç) and therefore it was something only
cultural (otntTov)44 which meant that more obedience had to be
given to nature than to laws. In practice this meant that the Cynics
" Critias (460-403 B.C.E.), frg. 25, H. Diels-W. Kranz, Vmsakntika, II,
386-8.
40 A. Bill, La Morale et la Loi. Etude préliminaire sur le problème de la loi dans la
philosophie antique préchrétienne (Strasbourg: Alsacienne, 1928) 54.
41 Cf. also (he saying attributed to Democritus in Epiphanius, Adtiersus haereses
III, 2, 9, 'Laws are a bad invention, and it befits the wise not to obey the laws,
but to live freely' (H. Diels-W. Kranz, Vorsokmliker, II, 129).
*2 D.B. Dudley, A History of Cynicism, From Diogenes to the 6th Century A. D. (Lon-
don: Methuen, 1937) 14, 31; A. Bill, La Morale, 159.
41 Diogenes Laertius VI, 71 (trans. R.D. Hicks in LCL). This attitude is also
expressed in the metaphor 7tapaxotp<rmiv -ra vóuiaua, attributed to Diogenes of
Sinope (see H. Niehues-Pröbsting, Kynismus, 43-77).
14 Diogenes Laertius VI, 72; cf. D.B. Dudley, Cynicism, 35-36.
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did not feel obliged to obey the laws of any city. They considered
themselves world citizens (xociu.ojcoAm'ic, Diogenes Laertius VI,
63), and thus they had to follow the law of the universe, i.e. the law
of nature.*5
The rejection of human laws remained part of the Cynic philoso-
phy through the ages. The Cynics were notorious in this respect.
According to Strabo, Mandants, a pupil of Diogenes, said that the
Greeks were wrong in one respect, 'they preferred law to nature'.*6
Maximus of Tyre, who sympathized greatly with Cynicism,
discusses in his 36th discourse the question of to what extent
Cynicism and Stoicism agree. He writes about Diogenes of Sinope
that he 'went about the earth entirely free, ... not constrained by
any law'.*' Maximus concludes that Diogenes was more free than
Socrates, for Socrates obeyed human laws, the laws of Solon, which
led to his death, whereas he should have obeyed the law of Zeus,
the godly law or the law of nature (36, 6). To follow the law of
nature, which included a negation of existing laws," it was
necessary to become free, independent.*9 Like pleasures and
desires, human laws were seen as unnecessary obstacles in the pro-
cess of becoming a good, wise man.
Also according to other Hellenistic authors, laws were mere
human convention, by definition associated with all the negative
aspects of human life of which only nature could liberate. Dio
Chrysostom's attitude towards the law, for instance, seems
ambiguous. He is ambiguous because he is playing the sophistical
game, taking more or less opposite views.50 On the one hand Dio
glorifies the law, on the other hand he sharply criticizes it. His 75th
discourse (On law) is a eulogy on the law. The law is more ser-
viceable to a city than a wall (75, 1), it is called 'king of men and
gods' (75, 2). However, in his 76th discourse (On custom) the law
is contrasted with custom (t'Qot;), also called the 'unwritten law' (76,
" H. Schulz-Falkenthal: 'Die Kyniker stellten sich auKerhalb dcr Gesellschaft
und lebten als AuBenseiter nach "Naturgesetzcn" die sie sich selber gaben'
('KaTi 9Uaiv. Bemerkungen zum Ideal des naturgemàfien Lebens bei den
"àlteren" Kyniker', Wiss. Zeil. ML Univ. HalU-Wittenberg 26 [1977] 2, 57).
6 Strabo, Geographic 15, l, 65.
Maximus Tyrius, Disserlationes 36, 5 (trans. F. Sayre, Diogenes ojSinope. A
Stiufy of Greek Cynicism [Baltimore: J.H. Furst, 1938] 9).
F. Sayre, Diogenes, 12.
Maximus Tyrius, Dissertationes 6, 5; Epictetus, Disseriationes IV, l, 150; 7 , 1 7 ,
Cf. A. Bill, La Morale, 194-6.
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1), which is written within the hearts instead of on tablets of wood
or stone (76, 3). The written law creates a 'polity of slaves', but the
unwritten law a 'polity of free men' (76, 4). In his 80th discourse,
titled On freedom, he goes even further, stating that Solon, one of the
earliest lawgivers (vo(io6ein)i;), had framed such laws as he assumed
the Greeks would accept, instead of making laws in accordance with
the law of nature. 'He composed bad laws .. . laws which would
satisfy bad men' (80, 4). These laws suppress people and prevent
people from being free; they are the bonds of slavery. Despite the
positive function which Dio Chrysostom attributes to the law, he
recognizes at the same time its negative side. The law itself does not
provide any justice, nor any guidance for virtuous living. The law
can chastise, but it cannot prevent people from doing evil. There-
fore, in accordance with the Sophists, Dio maintains that the
human laws should not be abandoned altogether, but should not be
taken as a guiding principle either.
Whereas Dio Chrysostom identified nature with custom, or
unwritten law,51 Epictetus the Stoic identified nature with the 'law
of God' (Dissertationes I, 29, 13; 29, 4), also called the 'law of nature'
(vo|j.oç çuaixoç, III, 17, 6). The laws of God should be valued more
highly than human laws, or, as Epictetus calls them, 'the laws of
Masurius and Cassius'55 (IV, 3, 12). Even more, the human laws
are 'wretched' (taXainupoc), they are 'laws of the dead' (I, 13, 5).
Instead, one must follow the laws of God (I, 13, 5) which will lead
to freedom.53
B. The origin and degeneration of culture
Widely current in the Hellenistic world was the idea that over the
centuries humanity has declined since the glorious times of its
beginning. The beginning of human culture was seen as a golden
age; owing to man's wickedness, however, society slowly
degenerated. According to many philosophers, the times had
" Also called 'law of nature' (wSuoç çùatuç. 80, 5) or 'ordinance of Zeus' (
6e<j|iov, 80, 6).
32 Two distinguished jurists of the first half of the first century C.E.
53 Also Cicero speaks of a law of nature in contradistinction to written laws.
Justice is more than 'conformity to written laws and national customs'; justice
only exists by nature (De legibus II, xvii, 42), to which all laws and customs should
be conformed (II, v, 13; xvi, 43). Only through the divine reason which is derived
from nature one can distinguish between right and wrong. Therefore reason itself
is a law (II, iv, 10).
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changed for the worse, and man's goal was to return to the wonder-
ful time of his ancestors. This so-called idea of Ursprung und
Entartung** appears in many authors, Greek and Latin, and in dif-
ferent forms.55 They differed as to when and how the degeneration
actually started and how man was able to regain the primeval bliss
of the golden age.
Posidonius is one of the philosophers who developed this view of
history56 with special attention to the position of the law(s). In his
discussion of Judaism,57 for instance, he glorifies the beginning of
the Hebrew people under the guidance of Moses, a good and pious
leader who governed his people very well (Strabo, Geographia 16, 2,
36). Moses was a good leader because, being a priest, he received
his ordinances directly from his God. However, after Moses
'superstitious' priests were appointed and 'tyrannical people'.
These leaders ordered all kinds of strange observances like circum-
cisions, excisions, and abstinence of flesh (16, 2, 37). Posidonius
concludes, in the words of Strabo: 'their beginning was not bad,
but they turned out for the worse' (làç àpxàç Xa^ov-ctç où tpaUAac,
àxTpairo|ievoi S' lm TO x&ïpov, 16, 2, 39). In this view the downfall
from the golden times was a twofold process: from piety to supersti-
tion and from righteousness to tyranny.58 The decadence of
humanity also concerned the laws. Posidonius makes a distinction
between the good and righteous laws (ordinances) of the golden
age, those of Moses, and the tyrannical laws passed in the time after
Moses.
For Posidonius the earliest laws, composed by the ancient
lawgivers like Moses and Solon, belong to the golden age. Yet not
all authors who have written on the concept of the origin and
s* The phrase is taken from K. Reinhardt, Poseidonios uber Ursprung und Entar-
tung (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1928).
5S A.O. Lovejoy-G. Boas, Primitiuism and Related Ideas in Antiquity (Baltimore:
John Hopkins, 1935) 23-53; E.R. Dodds, 'The Ancient Concept of Progress', The
Ancient Concept of Progress and other Essays on Greek Literature and Belief (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1973) 13.
" The works of Posidonius (c. 135-51 B.C.E.) are all lost; we only have
fragments and excerpts of them in the works of Diodorus Siculus, Strabo, and
Athenaeus. See for a detailed analysis of the problem of reconstructing Posidonius'
works, J. Malitz, Die Historien des Poscidonios (Zetemata 79; München: Oscar Beck,
1983) 34-59.
" Strabo, Geographia 16, 2, 34-40.
18 See particularly 16, 2, 37; furthermore, K. Reinhardt, Ursprung und Entar-
tung, 22; M. Whittaker, Jews and Christian:: Graeco-Roman Views (Cambridge:
University Press, 1984) 50-52.
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degeneration of culture agree on this point. Seneca, for instance,
sees the degeneration start before the time of the (first) laws and
regarded the laws as a reaction to the degeneration of mankind.59
Laws were made to control the wickedness of men and thus they are
not bad in themselves. Philo agrees with Seneca on this point.
According to Philo the degeneration started before the time of the
law, already with Adam, and the law itself (the law of Moses) was
made to control and order the disordered and sinful society.60
The Cynics, who of all philosophers held the strongest views
about the degeneration of mankind,61 went even further: because
laws were the result of men's wickedness, the laws themselves were
not good either. Men should return to the time when there were no
laws, the golden time of their ancestors when people lived according
to nature (xa-ca tpûaiv). In this way the Cynics combined both the
antithesis of nature vs. law and the concept of the degeneration of
humanity into one sharp criticism of human culture and into a plea
to return to a life in accordance with nature.
C. Cynics and their valuation of laws
The Cynics considered themselves to be 'called to the healing of
a sick culture'." Therefore they criticized and rejected all human
convention and lived what they considered to be a life in harmony
with nature (çûatç). This way of living came down to austerity in
morals, self-sufficiency, and independence.63 Human laws and con-
59 Seneca, AdLucilium Epislulae Morales 90, 4-6; cf. also Tacitus, Annales III, 26.
M In Philo's view the law of Moses is in agreement with the law of nature and
the ordinances of Moses are 'nothing else than memorials of the life of the
ancients' (De Abrahamo 5). In general, laws are meant to fill 'the souls of free men
with comfortable hopes; but he who gains this virtue of hopefullness without being
led to it by exhortation or command has been educated into it by a law which
nature has laid down, a law unwritten yet intuitively learnt' (De Abrahamo 16;
trans. F.H. Colson in LCL). See for Philo's concepts of unwritten law and law
of nature, R.A. Horsley, 'The Law of Nature in Philo and Cicero', HThR 91
(1978) 35-59; J.W. Martens, 'Unwritten Law in Philo: A Response to Naomi G.
Cohen', JJS 43 (1992) 38-45; for the concept of unwritten law in general see also,
R. Hirzel, '"Afpaçoç Nouoç', Abhandtungen der pkil. -kist. Classe der kon. Sàchsischfn
GaeUschaJt der Wissenschaften 20 (1903) 1-100.
" A.O. Lovejoy-G. Boas, Primitivism, 117-23; E.R. Dodds, Concept of Progress,
13.
« E.R. Dodds, Concept oj Progress, 17; E. Zeiler, Die Philosophie der Griecken in
ihrer geichicküichen Enlwicklung (5th éd.; Leipzig: O.R. Reisland, 1922) II, l, 332.
H E. Zeiler: 'Sitlenslrmgc, Bedürfhislosigkeil, Unabhangigkeit' (Philosophie, II, l,
316). D.B. Dudley (Cynicism, 31) describes the Cynic life xoni tpociiv as a stripping
away of all 'accretions of conventions, tradition and social existence'.
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vention were seen as bonds which hindered their freedom, a
freedom which was present in the golden age.64
The Cynic criticism of human conventions and laws is recorded
by Plutarch who writes about Anacharsis65 that he laughed at Solon
'for thinking that he could check the injustice and rapacity of the
citizens by written laws'. Laws are just like spiders' webs, they hold
the weak, but will be torn by the rich and the powerful.66 Solon
replies that he had made the laws 'in such a manner that the prac-
tice of justice was more advantageous than the transgression of
laws' (V, 3). But, the author concludes, 'the results justified the
conjecture of Anacharsis rather than the hopes of Solon' (V, 3).
The laws were introduced because of man's wickedness, and were
of no help in repelling this wickedness. Similarly, Plutarch com-
ments on the laws of Lycurgus, that they were regarded as
'efficacious in producing valour, but defective in producing
righteousness'.67
In a pseudepigraphic letter attributed to Heraclitus (Ep. 7), the
Cynic criticism of society, and particularly its immorality, is the
dominant theme. In the letter68 the author criticizes the Ephesians
for their fraud, dishonesty, sexual aberration, lack of piety, and
luxurious living. Their immorality is conspicuously apparent in the
decree by which they banish Heraclitus from the city. The decree
stipulates that everyone who does not laugh has to leave the city and
Heraclitus is the only one who does not (want to) laugh because he
rejects the immoral behaviour of the Ephesians. It is rather he,
Heraclitus, who should be the judge of the Ephesians than vice
versa. He concludes:
•uou; vo^iouc jiotpapatvEtt, itapavouîaç vojzofimÏTE, ïîàvra [kàÇeaot a [JLTI TiEçijxatE. ta
(laXioTti ooxouv-x ÛLIÛV 5ixaioaûv7]ç Eivai aiinpoXa, ol V Ó L L O L . àBixîa; EÙJI Ttx[iT|piov. d
vip uf, rjaav, àvtor(v 5v aEÏ éicovrjpEÜEaÖE' vüv 8è i\ TI xai |uxpov Èit
tÉxtsÖE tou aSocEÏv.
64 Sec F.S. Jones, Freiheit, 93, and the references to primary sources and secon-
dary literature mentioned there.
" Anacharsis, a 6th century B.C.E. sage, is often displayed with Cynic charac-
teristics SeeJ.F. Kindstrand, Anacharsis. The Legend and the Apopktkegmata (Upp-
sala: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1981).
" Solon V, 2 (trans. B. Perrin in LCL). Cf. Diogenes Laertius I, 64-65, where
Solon himself notices the same weakness of his laws: good leaders will benefit from
his laws, tyrant leaders will not be restrained by them.
" Lycurgus 28 (trans. B. Perrin in LCL).
" The letter dates from the first century C.E.; see H.W. Attridge, First-century
Cynicism in the Epistles of Heraclitus (HTS 29; Missoula: Scholars, 1976) 6.
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You transgress the laws; you enact illegalities; you perform by force everything
which you cannot do by nature. The things which seem to be preeminently the
symbols of justice among you, the laws, are evidence of vice. For if they did not
exist, you would commit vice freely all the time, but now you are curbed, even
if just a little; by fear of punishment you are kept from committing injustice.69
We recognize the antithesis of physis vs. nomos: napavojitac
vo|xo8eteÎTE , literally 'you make unlawful laws' , in other words, laws
against the law of nature.70 Furthermore, the laws bring to light
man's wickedness, they are evidence of vice. Nevertheless, they do
impose some order on society, for if they were absent man would
commit vice unceasingly, but they only do so by inspiring fear of
punishment. The laws do not teach any righteousness; at the most,
they repel some wickedness.
A criticism similar to that of Heraclitus is found in a
pseudepigraphic letter attributed to Diogenes of Sinope (Ep. 28).
This letter, probably stemming from the period from the first cen-
tury B.C.E. to the first century C.E.," is a criticism of life in
general as lived by the 'so-called Greeks'. The author criticizes
their lust for war, their lack of reason, their educational system
which lacks education in righteousness, their uninhibited lustful
behaviour, in other words their 'un-natural' way of living. Implied
is a criticism of the laws.
ovrec yap TaTc [lev o^tatv av6p<o7toi, Taîç Si tjjuxœïç luBïixoi, icpoarcoitîoflt uiv tâvra,
YiTvïîxnwtt Se oùBÉv- Toiyàproi tiu-wpcttai ûuâç ï] (puai;- vouwç fàp ùuTv aùtoïç
u.rjxavTj0du.cvoi urfiarov xat nXtfcrov T-JÇOV c; aùtûv SitxXrjpwoaaôt, [Aiptupaç tfjç
È[i-tçuaitofiivT]ç xaxîaç
For although to all appearances you are men, you are apes at heart. You pretend
to everything, but know nothing. Therefore, nature takes vengeance on you, for
in contriving laws for yourselves you have allotted to yourselves the greatest and
most pervasive delusion that issues from them, and you admit them as witnesses
to your ingrained evil.73
The antithesis physis vs. nomos is brought to a climax: by making
laws, men have created a delusion which will eventually come upon
themselves. The laws do not provide order, but will turn against
society, a vengeance of nature, according to the author. Further-
" Text and translation taken from H.W. Attridge, Hiraclitus, 74-75.
7U For the expression 'law of nature' in the same epistle, see H.W. Attridge,
Htraclilus, 72, 5; 74, 18.
71 See the introduction to the collection of Diogenes' letters in A.J. Malherbe,
The Cynic EpistUs. A Study Edition (SBL Sources for Biblical Study 12; Missoula:
Scholars, 1977) 14-21.
71 Text (trans. B. Fiore) taken from A.J. Malherbe, The Cynic EpistUs, 120-1.
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more, laws are evidence of men's inborn wickedness. Laws and
wickedness are connected in a double way: laws are evidence of,
and in the end, will produce wickedness.
The Cynic criticism of laws can be summarized in three points.
First of all, laws do not belong to the realm of nature and are there-
fore by definition insufficient and unrighteous. Secondly, laws are
composed because of the degeneration of humanity, they are the
proof of man's wickedness. Thirdly, in the course of time laws are
made by wicked people, a further result of the degeneration of
humanity.
We can conclude that a relationship between laws and
wickedness is often made in classical and Hellenistic philosophy,
especially to describe the immorality of humanity.73 Against this
criticism of laws and the negative view of humanity stands the belief
in philosophy through which one can become truly moral and
righteous. The wise do not need laws, because they will do good
anyway.7* Demonax sums it all up when he says, 'that in all
likelihood the laws were of no use, whether framed for the bad or
the good; for the latter had no need of laws, and the former were
not improved by them'.75
4. 1 Cor 15:56 and its context
In his short aside on the role and power of death in human life
in 1 Cor 15:56 Paul describes the miserable state of humanity with
the help of Hellenistic ideas. The Hellenistic notion of the
degeneration of humanity seems to have enabled Paul to connect
death with sin. With Philo he agrees that the degeneration of
mankind, characterized by death and sin, started with the fall of
71 Cf. Strabo who, supposedly refering to Res publica 404 E - 405 A, reports that
Plato had said that 'where there are very many laws, there are also very many law-
suits and corrupt practices, just as where there are many physicians, there are also
likely to be many diseases' (Gtograptiia 6, I, 8, trans. H.L. Jones in LCL).
" Diogenes Laertius V, 20, 'When asked what the advantage he [Aristotle] had
ever gained from philosophy, he replied, "This, that I do without being ordered
what some are constrained to do by their fear of the law' ' ' (Cicero, De re publica
1, 3, says the same about Xenocrates; see also Diogenes Laertius II, 68-69; VI,
11).
7S Lucian, Demonax 59 (trans. A.M. Harmon in LCL). According to Lucian
Demonax was a pupil of Demetrius and Epictetus (Demonax 3) who had Diogenes
of Sinope and Socrates as his examples (Demonax 5).
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Adam. However, whereas for Philo the Jewish law is a way to over-
come this fallen state, Paul rejects any law, subscribing to the
negative view of law that was current among the Cynics who
regarded laws as part of the degeneration of humanity.76 In Paul's
opinion, death operates in the present age, and its 'sting', through
which it brings mortality to all men, is sin. Law is the stimulus, the
catalyst of men's wickedness.
Paul sympathized with this negative attitude towards law because
it fitted quite well in his apocalyptic world-view." According to
him, the present age was a time of evil but he was convinced that
since the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the present order
or aeon was running towards its end. Not only death and sin, but
also law as part of human culture and convention, are characteris-
tics of the old order and will pass away. At the end of time, when
Christ returns, death will decisively be destroyed, which implies the
end of the old order in all its aspects.
There is reason enough to believe that the Corinthians under-
stood Paul's short digression on the deplorable state of mankind in
1 Cor 15:56 very well. From other data in 1 Corinthians we may
conclude that the Christian community in Corinth was deeply
influenced by a Graeco-Roman world-view. Their emphasis on
wisdom, spiritual gifts, freedom, and the power to live as one wants
to, together with a denial of the bodily resurrection of the dead, are
clear proofs of their thoroughly Hellenistic way of thinking. They
experienced the gifts of the Holy Spirit, they felt free, they even felt
'kings' (1 Cor 4:8). Through his letter Paul tried to correct this
attitude. He pointed out to them where they were wrong. He drew
their attention, for instance, to the virtue of love as a restriction of
their ecstatic utterances and their freedom, but a necessity for the
building up of the Christian community.
In his argumentation about the future resurrection of believers
(1 Cor 15), Paul found it necessary to underline the power of death.
He referred to the future eternal bliss to be received through resur-
rection at the end of time, but at the same time he emphasized the
role of death in the present age. By connecting death with sin and
76 In Josephus, too, we find such a. negative view of law in general; the Jewish
Torah, however, is an exception: it is a code which by far surpasses all other laws
(see Contra A/riorum II, 145-295).
77 See also A.O. Lovejoy-G Boas, Primiiiuism, 85.
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sin with law Paul described humanity with the help of concepts
which he shared with many of his Hellenistic contemporaries and
which we may suppose were well-known to his adressées in Corinth
too.
Paul's understanding of the Jewish law in his polemics with
Judaizing Christians in his letters to the Galatians and the Romans
is shaped by this negative attitude towards law in general, as some-
thing belonging to the present aeon which will pass away at the end
of time when death will decisively be destroyed.78
78 Even in such a theological discussion on the law as Rom 7, Pau! refers to law
in a way that approximates this way of looking at it. It seems clear that in the
discussions on law in Galatians and Romans also Greek philosophical elements are
present. See also G. Bornkamm, 'Geselz und Natur. Röm 2:14-16', Gesammelte
Aufsatze (München: Kaiser, 1959) II, 93-118.
